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THOMAS TRAHERNE AND THE LOCATION OF INTRINSIC VALUE 
Robin Attfield 
From Dust I rise 
And out of nothing now awake, 
These Brighter Regions which salute mine Eyes 
A gift from GOD I take. 
The Earth, the Seas, the Light, the Day, the Skies, 
The Sun and Stars are mine; if these I prize. 
A Stranger here 
Strange Things doth meet, strange Glories See. 
Strange Treasures lodg'd in this fair World appear, 
Strange all and New to me: 
But that they mine should be, who nothing was, 
That Strangest is of all, yet brought to pass.1 
Thomas Traherne wrote these words in or around the 1660's. His 
poems and his 'Centuries of Meditation' are full of delight and rapture at 
the rare and startling beauty of nature and the world of creation: and 
sometimes he goes further and claims that the whole of nature is his, and 
he its sole heir. These and other claims of his are hard to square with the 
orthodoxy of belief to be expected in a seventeenth century Anglican 
priest, and might even suggest to the reader that the poet is speaking 
through the mouth of Christ. But this is not so, as the final stanza of 
his 'The Salutation' (quoted above) discloses. For he there relates that the 
speaker, who is a stranger to the world, was previously nothing and has 
awoken "out of nothing": and these words could not at that time be 
ascribed to Christ. Traherne, then, is speaking with his own voice, as 
indeed his other works make apparent, and holds that the whole creation 
is no less than a gift to himself. Indeed, as he tells a friend, in his belief 
"The End for which you were Created is that by Prizing all that God hath 
don, you may Enjoy your self and Him in Blessedness".2 And such felicity 
involves valuing rightly the whole of creation including each human self, 
for which the rest of creation was made. 
One of the particular sources of his wonder is the very body which he 
as an infant received. Traherne does not here write as if he were a 
disembodied soul which had newly received a body, or as if he could have 
existed without one: indeed, on his own account, before he received his 
body he was nothing. Rather he is marvelling that he, and his infant body 
with him, came into existence, and that the body which is his belongs to 
him at all, when he might have been nothing. Thus he expresses a strong 
sense of the contingency of his own existence, as well as of the 
contingency of each item in creation, together with a sense of wonder 
thereat. 
Many philosophers, when contemplating the same phenomena, have 
shared Traherne's sense of- contingency but not his sense of wonder. The 
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fact that we exist whether we like it or not is regarded by Existentialists 
as something which we need to come to terms with : our so-called 
"Geworfenheit" is even a possible object of resentment. But with Traherne 
this is not so. How are we to account for the difference? And is Traherne's 
response to the world around him one which it is in any way reasonable 
to share? 
Perhaps the obvious response at this point is to remark that Traherne 
was a Christian, however unorthodox, and that accordingly he was obliged 
to see life and nature as a gift of God, as he does in the poem already 
quoted. The "logical grammar" of his beliefs, it might be suggested, 
required belief in the goodness of creation: and to those whose beliefs 
are differently constituted, his reactions can be no more than a historical 
curiosity. 
Now certainly we need to understand Traherne's beliefs about God in 
order to make sense of his account of the end of created persons or of his 
view that each person is the sole heir of creation. Yet nevertheless the 
suggested critique seems to me to be both theologically and philosophi-
cally confused. It is no part of Traherne's theology to impute goodness 
to creation simply because it has been created by God. Rather God prizes 
things "according to their value" and "rightly",3 and that is how we 
should prize them too. Like the Cambridge Platonists, and like Leibniz 
later in the century, Traherne wanted to praise God for his goodness: 
but, as they saw, such praise would have been empty if he had been 
praising God simply for creating whatever he created. Such a theological 
position, indeed, is compatible with resentment at the way that it has 
pleased God to arrange things. But Traherne is genuinely delighted by the 
things which he surveys, and believes that he has genuine grounds for 
praise and rapture. Things, including his own body, could have been 
created otherwise, and they might have not been created at all. "Had God 
created Thee alone", he tells his soul, "He had not been so good as He is".4 
In fact, though contingent, the natural order is delightful, so much so that, 
paradoxically enough, he pretends that the very corn in the fields is 
immortal, wheat "which never should be reap'd nor was ever sown". 5 
This is not the language of a man who is constrained by his beliefs to 
put a brave and cheerful face on things . 
Besides this, Traherne shows a surprising indifference to some of the 
beliefs which were normally constitutive of seventeenth century Anglican 
orthodoxy, even when this is taken to include the beliefs of the other 
"metaphysical poets". Thus there are good grounds for holding that he 
was a Pelagian and rejected the orthodox doctrine of original sin,6 while, 
when he writes, as he does in his poem 'Wonder', "I nothing in the World 
did know/But 'twas Divine", he comes close to pantheism. To write thus 
is not, perhaps to abandon belief in a transcendent God, but it is to believe 
that all nature partakes of God's divinity, and this in a much stronger 
sense than orthodoxy normally allowed . This supplies an extra reason for 
holding that Traherne considered the trees, the skies and the stars 
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wonderful not just because they were created, but in their own right: 
and it also suggests that individuals are more free to depart from those 
beliefs which are supposed to be constitutive of the world-view of the 
tradition to which they belong than is often allowed by philosophers. 
Of course, Traherne could draw on a long succession of mystical and 
heterodox writers, and his ideas were not themselves in all respects a new 
beginning. Yet he made himself free to arrive at an original conjunction of 
beliefs: and we should beware of the philosophical view that, granted his 
religious tradition, the holding of these beliefs by him was inevitable , and 
of the related view that, granted our different starting point, the holding 
of them now is foreclosed to ourselves. It is a philosophical confusion, 
then, to hold that those beliefs which are constitutive of a tradition are 
not open to revision by those who inherit that tradition : and this applies 
not only to the beliefs of seventeenth century Anglicans but also to our 
own. 
Traherne, then, believes that there are objective considerations which 
uphold his high estimate of the value of the seas, the sun and the stars: 
and it would seem possible, without entering into a discussion of his 
theological beliefs, to investigate whether his attitudes towards natural 
o hjects are ones which we can reasonably share. These attitudes depend, 
of course, on his belief in the contingency of the qualities and of the 
existence of the material world and of ourselves: but this is a belief which, 
as we have seen, many people hold, and one, surely, which, for all that 
it conjures up the possibility of unimaginably different or empty worlds, 
is none the less coherent. Traheme himself helps us to begin to imagine 
such a possibility: "Suppose the Sun were Extinguished: or the Sea were 
Drie. There would be no Light, no Beauty, no Warmth, no Fruits, no 
Flowers, no Pleasant Gardens, Feasts, or Prospects. No Wine no Oyl no 
Bread, no Life, no Motion. Would you not give all the Gold and Silver in 
the Indies for such a Treasure?"7 With not many scientific adjustments, 
we can easily see what he is getting at. 
Consider now the following argument, which may be found variously 
in the works of Aristotle, John Wisdom and Vernon Pratt, and which is 
designed to show that there is something of intrinsic value, i.e. of value for 
no reason beyond itself. So long as there is something, the argument runs , 
which is extrinsically or instrumentally desirable, then something is 
intrinsically desirable: for otherwise there would be nothing which gives 
its value or desirability to that which is extrinsically desirable. Thus as 
long as there is something which is desirable, either extrinsically or 
intrinsically, then something is intrinsically desirable. Accordingly anyone 
who accepts that anything whatever is desirable in any way whatever must 
accept, if they are consistent, that something is desirable intrinsically, 
that is, for its own sake and for no reason beyond itself. 
Now the force of this argument could be evaded by a certain kind of 
nihilist, the kind who hold that everything is pointless and futile and that 
nothing is worthwhile or of value . Their position is a consistent one, 
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albeit precarious, but if they stick to it they are irremovable. If on the 
other hand they grant as much as the desirability of arguing against views 
opposed to their own, they fall into inconsistency and are exposed to the 
full vigour of the argument: and if they see any advantage in staying alive, 
they once again concede the vital premise. And anyone other than the 
consistent nihilist is obliged to go along with the argument. 
Some philosophers would at this point contend that what is desirable 
or of value is merely desirable to someone or valued by someone, and 
therefore that the whole argument cryptically concerns not the value of 
things like trees or conditions like health but the psychological states and 
preferences of valuers, i.e. of human subjects. But this contention will 
not stand up to analysis. For when someone values something, they do 
not regard it as simply valued by themselves. Philosophers who take this 
line are in no position to supply a satisfactory answer to the question 
"What do valuers value things as?" Thus 'valuable' does not mean 'valued 
by someone or other', as Traherne recognises when he writes of God 
prizing "all things according to their value". Rather it means 'that which 
there is reason to want or aspire to or be glad of or cherish'. Thus Traherne 
is claiming that there is reason to be glad of the corn-fields, the trees, the 
skies and the stars, and also of ones own body, soul and faculties. But he 
would not have claimed intrinsic value for all of these. 
Traherne did, however, discriminate between the values of different 
items in creation. His rapture towards creation as a whole was compre-
hensive only through his explicit suspension of belief in life as it was . 
"I knew not", he writes, "that there were sins or complaints or laws. 
I dream'd not of poverties, contentions or vices. All tears and quarrels 
were hidden from mine eyes." A similar passage is to be found in his poem 
'Eden'8 : and it is only by transporting himself to the garden of Eden that 
he manages to find all things good. His awareness that he needs to dream 
some evils away discloses that not everything is in his view rare or glorious. 
This being so, what is the basis of his discrimination? We may allow 
that there must be something which is of intrinsic value, but further 
argument is needed before claims to have identified it, or to have 
identified those things which sustain it, are acceptable. The enterprise of 
defending claims about value can begin with the fact that some states of 
persons are ones which they have reason to desire, these being states which 
are good ones for persons as persons to be in. Possession of one's faculties, 
autonomy of mind and fulfilment in one's work are plausible examples: 
that they are more than just plausible I have argued elsehwere.9 Indeed for 
species in general, wherever capacities are essential to a species, whether 
distinctively or not, the ability to exercise that capacity is, I maintain, 
a good state for a species-member to enjoy. 
Essential capacities in a species are ones in the absence of which from 
most members that species would not be the one which it is: and these 
essential capacities, of course, include physical ones. This is certainly 
a point which Traherne could accept: even though he correctly holds that 
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it is a contingency that he exists and has thus received a body, it does not 
follow (nor is it true) that it is a contingency that existing persons have 
bodies. And he certainly did accept that the ability to use our physical 
senses is good, and hence that the possession of organs allowing of the use 
of the senses, and also of the abilities to sing and talk, is also good. As 
he puts it : 
My Urns and Members when rightly Prized, are Comparable to the 
fine Gold; The Topaz of Ethiopia and the Gold of Ophir are not to be 
compared to them. What Diamonds are Equal to my Eys; What 
Labyrinths to mine Ears; What gates of Ivory, or Rubie Leaves to the 
Double Portal of my Lips and Teeth? Is not Sight a Jewel? Is not 
Hearing a Treasure? Is not Speech a Glory! 0 my Lord Pardon my 
lngratitud and pitty my Dulnes, who am not sensible to these 
Gifts. 1 0 
Indeed whatever else there is reason to want or cherish, there is reason to 
want or cherish our faculties and powers, and their physical wherewithal. 
Though Traherne does not write of essential capacities, he does write, 
about the limitlessness of his own Soul, "My Essence was Capacitie", 
referring to its power to roam up and down the spatial and temporal 
universe. This power to reason about past, present and future, to form 
generalisations and to apply them to practical instances is, I have argued 
elsewhere/ 1 a genuine sential capacity of humans ; and Traherne makes 
clear in his poem 'My Spirit' his acceptance that its exercise is to be prized 
as highly as anything else in creation. His Soul is indeed 'An Image of the 
Deitie', and he can add that it is also 'The only Proper Place or Bower of 
Bliss'. Here, perhaps, he hypostatises the soul too much, but he also 
recognises at the same time the value of those of a persons's powers which 
allow them to attain 'Bliss' 'Felicity' or 'Enjoyment'. And here we have 
his notion of a state which it is necessarily good to have, which is desirable 
for no reason beyond itself, which is complete within itself, and in which 
the person thus blessed is conscious of its attainment. (Its attainment 
involves in his view profound changes to one's understanding and 
attitudes, expressed in a number of Meditations which begin with words 
such as "You never Enjoy the World aright, till ... ", but his account of 
the road to Felicity cannot be expounded here.) 
Felicity, then, involves certain attitudes, but it also depends on the 
exercise of one's physical and psychological powers, and is impaired by 
their neglect or atrophy. As they are constitutive of Felicity, it is 
reasonable to take Traherne as holding them to be, in his view, of intrinsic 
rather than of instrumental value. Here, then, is at least part of his account 
of intrinsic value: and it must be added that so far the account is a 
reasonable one. For what else is there reason to desire, if the exercise of 
one's powers is not desirable? Admittedly there may be contingent 
advantages to blindness, deafness, dulness or even madness: but necessarily 
these conditions also involve liabilities, and the attainment or recovery 
of their opposites is necessarily a blessing for persons as persons . 
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If, then, anything is of value, then the exercise of one 's powers is so. 
But can we then stop short, and not recognise the like value in the exercise 
of the powers of others? For, unless we can discover some relevant 
difference, we must judge like cases alike. Obviously I do not have the same 
reason to desire your ability to exercise your powers as I have to desire 
my own ability to exercise mine : yet if my ability so to do would be good 
and valuable, so would be yours. Traherne puts the point in theological 
dress: " ... as He (God) maketh one, so He maketh evry one the End of 
the World ... Souls are Gods Jewels. Evry one of which is worth many 
Worlds". 1 2 
It may seem, nevertheless, that the argument here slides from the 
notion of what there is reason for one agent to desire, cherish or be glad 
of to that of what there is reason for any agent to cherish, etc.: my own 
interests, it may be felt, are only valuable in the first sense, whereas I am 
now asked to accept that yours are or value in the second sense. In reply 
to this objection, I want to maintain that the operative sense of 'valuable' 
has all along been the second one. Certainly I have special reasons for 
desiring my own wellbeing, but I have to acknowledge from the start that 
Felicity is also a good condition for you to be in .. If conditions like that 
are not desirable, then nothing is, whoever is the beneficiary; and whatever 
brings them about does good, whether it is you acting out of prudence, or 
me acting out of friendship, or forces beyond the control of either of us. 
All that the recent argument accomplishes is to bring out that if any one 
person's welfare is valuable in this sense, so is any other 's. The same point 
can be put in moral terms: thus when we foster other per ons' wellbeing 
we do good just as when we foster our own. But this moral truth 
presupposes that there is value in the good of persons (at least), and if so 
a value which can be talked about independently of moral considerations. 
Indeed the very same argument can readily be extended to whatever 
has a good, so long as it is comparable to that of persons. Some animals 
are in many respects closely comparable to most humans, and their own 
fulfilment would therefore seem to be of intrinsic value, even if to a lesser 
extent. But Traherne would almost certainly have rejected any such 
extension of the argument. It is not so much that he would have denied 
that animals have souls at all, but rather that the kind of soul which, as an 
Aristotelian, he would have attributed to non-human animals would lack 
the powers "which are so Great that even to the most learned of men 
their Greatness is incredible; and so Divine, that they are infinit in 
Value" . 1 3 His own belief, unlike that of most of the Old Testament 
writers, was that (the) "Beasts and Fowls and fishes (were) made for me". 
Not all seventeenth century Christians adopted an anthropocentric view 
of the purpose of creation, but Traherne, it must be acknowledged, held 
that non-human creatures existed not only for man but for himself in 
particular, as also for each other self. Thus, in his view, the value of 
non-human organisms is purely instrumental. 
But of course Traherne's claims stretch far beyond the value of the 
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organic. Is it reasonable, we may now ask, to share his belief in the value 
of air and water, the sun and the stars? Perhaps there is, when they are 
considered as the objects of human faculties as in 'The Salutation' (and, 
we might add, of animal faculties in general). Pleasure, as Aristotle said, 1 4 
consists in unimpeded activity performed in appropriate conditions: but 
the conditions which are appropriate for the exercise of sight are light and 
objects wl1ich allow our perceptual faculties to be brought to bear, 
whether lofty and sublime like the stars or minute like the animalcules 
which Traherne's contemporarie were beginning to study through 
microscopes. If sight is good, then so, other Utings being equal, are things 
seen, though not, as Traherne realised, when they bring sorrow or involve 
blight or corruption. And of objects seen, though human artifacts were 
absent from Traherne's Eden, 15 it included a multitude of natural objects 
which at least seemed designed to delight the eye, But even those who 
reject this theological belief can accept judgments which accord value to 
such objects of sight so long as they can take delight in their senses, or 
even rejoice at the delight taken by others. 
Traherne himself also employs a distinct argument for the value of the 
sun and the hydrosphere. It comes just before the passage quoted earlier 
about what the world would be like without them. "It was His Wisdom 
made you Need the Sun. It was His Goodness made you need the Sea. Be 
sensible of what you need, or Enjoy neither. Consider how much you 
need them. For thence they Derive their Value." Thus the sun and the seas 
are valuable because of the human needs which they serve. It will now be 
clear that Traherne does not normally value just anything which happens 
to have been created, but esteems things because of what he takes to be 
their merits. All that can be said against this is that the very needs which 
give the elements their value are ones created by God. But then, human 
life in any recognisable form would involve dependence on some items in 
the natural environment. 
Among the created items which Traherne regards as valuable, then, 
some are valuable in their own right, such as the physical and spiritual 
powers of humans, while others, such as light, the seas and the sun are 
valuable because they enable humans with these powers to live and 
exercise them. Thus Traherne himself observes, though without using these 
terms, the distinction between intrinsic and instrumental value. His 
employment of this distinction is unambiguously anthropocentric, yet the 
same arguments could admit of the conclusions that some non-human 
animals are of intrinsic value, having power3 comparable to those of 
humans, and that the elements are of value not only in enabling human 
needs to be satisfied but also in enabling those of animals to be satisfied 
too. What is more important is that the same arguments are accessible to 
ourselves as well, and that they do go a long way towards sustaining his 
conclusions, modified, perhaps, in the manner just suggested. 
The relation that all this has to theology can readily be brought out: 
if Traherne has grounds independent of belief in God for regarding the 
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furniture of creation as good, there are all the more grounds for praising 
God, if but God is its reator. Such praise can be heart-felt praise, for it is 
not based on the assumption that whatever God makes is good just 
because he makes it. Rather it is based on the contingent goodness of the 
actual world, and of the actual existence of those who appreciate it and 
are enabled by it to exercise their powers. 
The bearing of these matters on ecological ethics is more oblique. 
There will be moral reasons against the befouling of the springs of the 
enjoyment of sentient creatures by the pollution of earth, air and water, 
and against any human artifacts which weaken the capacity of the 
elements to satisfy the needs of these creatures. But, as Traherne realised, 
there arc "poverties, .. . tears and quarrels", and there are also moral 
reasons for action to overcome them: and th.is action can conflict with 
leaving wild nature intact. Unlike Eden, not "Everything" is "at rest, free 
and immortal". Yet if the claims just made about value are correct, then 
such interventions need in each case to be justified: for the items we 
remould are not devoid of value. Their value, however, becomes more 
apparent if the analogies between human and non-human creatures are 
pressed muc'h further than Traherne took them. 
It is also apparent that there is such a subject a the study of value 
which can proceed independently of either the study of morality or of 
religion. Morality presupposes the existence of non-moral values, just as 
prudence 1>resupposes the existence of non-prudential values. Nor do these 
values depend for their existence upon that of God. Their study, perhaps, 
is part' of the subject-matter of aesthetics, though ven th.i.s connection 
should not be exaggerated, since thing can have a value even when they 
are not being enjoyed. Beyond this I cannot take further the study of 
value here, beyond the suggestion that Traherne may yet be able to help 
us by his poetry as well as through his ideas , in seeing the value w h.ich 
natural objects have, and how "inexpressibly rare and delightful and 
beautiful: ....... spotless and pure and glorious" they can be. 
NOTES 
The Skies in their Magnificence, 
The Lively, Lovely Air, 
0 how Divine, how soft, how Sweet, how fair! 
The Stars did entertain my Sence; 
And all the Works of GOD so Bright and pure, 
So Rich and Great did seem, 
As if they ever must endure, 
In my Esteem. 1 6 
I. Stanzas 5 and 7 of 'The Salutation', from Anne Ridler (ed.) Thomas 
Traherne: Poems, Centuries and Three Thanksgivings, London: Oxford 
University Press, 1966, at p. 6. 
2. 'Centuries', I: 12. This extract was italicised by Traherne. 
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